
Introduction – Why Galileo?
Galileo Galilei is often portrayed as one of the greatest scientists ever lived, primarily because everybody knows him. In fact, for all the standard statements around the ‘best’ philosopher or mathematician, rarely reasons are given or an alternative candidate pool is listed. For example, it seems questionable to consider this ‘candidate’ existing as there is no clear ‘good order’ to be established within the list of ‘the greatest scientists’ as there usually no explanation for the rule through which an item was selected among others. It is likely the case that, for some circumstantial condition, a given name, possibly ignored during their life, was then passed to the common vocabulary to mean a particular representative of the set they belong. For example, it is my extensive experience that almost no one knows much about Albert Einstein’s life or research, but everyone today (2026) refers him to mean the ‘exemplary scientists’ (once it was Newton, known progressively less by the ‘wide public’).
When it comes to Galileo, he undoubtedly was an important figure, but this does not say much. What instead I want to argue against something often considered an obvious mantra: ‘Nature is written in mathematical language’, a short encapsulation of the early revolution in physics from the Aristotelian to the ‘modern’ notion of it. To this day, the ‘envy’ of other sciences and research fields is still based on the ‘mathematical aspirational dogma’, that is, mathematics applications discriminate the ‘hard core’ science from everything else.
“Philosophy [nature] is written in that great book which ever is before our eyes — I mean the universe — but we cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the symbols in which it is written. The book is written in mathematical language, and the symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures, without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it; without which one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth.”[1]
First, I will try to prove that this statement is wrong, that is, false. Second, I will argue that this is not how ‘science’ sees the world and, finally, that this is not how we should see it and, in fact, it is impossible otherwise. Let’s start from the beginning but, before that, a specification. I am not ‘against’ Galileo about whom I have my own opinion. My arguments equally apply to any assumed philosophy of science based on similar premises or that explicitly or implicitly endorse it. As Galileo’s formulation is as famous as ‘clear’, we shall use it in proxy of something potentially more elaborated and, as such, more obscure.
There is no Book Called ‘Nature’
Galileo’s statement can be interpreted as a metaphor, where he is arguing that the world is mathematical in nature (‘the great book which ever is before our eyes – I mean the universe’). However, are we sure that he was drawing a metaphor? Minimally, his metaphor contains parts that are not metaphorical. This is exactly his point ‘The book is written in mathematical language (…), without whose help it is impossible to comprehend a single word of it’. But if this statement is true, it is not mathematical. Firstly, the statement itself is not written in mathematical language, and it is unclear even how this statement could be written in purely mathematical expression of any sort without adding axioms that are not mathematical in nature. Therefore, we now know for a fact that not all nature can be reduced to a mathematical statement. Hence, Galileo’s conception is incomplete, if it is consistent and, at best, it contains a false generalization as not all nature is written in mathematical language.[2] Hence, it is unlikely consistent. But what about the ‘book’ itself?
As he stated, the ‘book’ is ‘before our eyes’. But mathematics is not ‘before or after’ our eyes or any ‘eye’ whatever, unless the ‘mind’s eye’ is included (an expression that, for example, is rarely used even in English and clearly metaphorical). But it is quite clear that for Galileo the world is literally in front of him. But mathematics is inside him. Of course, one can argue that this might be a particular mathematical interpretation of the ontological nature of numbers and mathematical objects in line with what today is attributed to Plato, Renes Descartes (1595-1650) and Kurt Gödel (1906-1973), named as ‘mathematical Platonism’; the idea that mathematical objects exist independently than any physical nature.[3] Numbers and circles would exist even after the end of time and pre-date any universe. They are simply there already. If Galileo was thinking in these lines, then he couldn’t have argued that those are ‘symbols’ but rather ‘core components’ of nature at least in the sense that our ‘universe’ is both ‘physical and numerical’ where these two are distinct and united in composing the ‘totality’ of all possible existing objects. But this is clearly denied in two different places and there is no strong reason to believe he thought whether numbers and circles are already included in nature or not, while one must concede that their representations are (those written on paper, for example). But those ‘qua-representations’ cannot be genuinely counted as the number ‘1’ is not reducible to the totality of times in which ‘1’ was used or written down and the proof is simple. Let’s imagine a number than nobody ever calculated yet, such as the biggest prime number after the biggest currently calculated. That number shall have all the properties of a number (and of a prime) even though we cannot tell which one it is. Therefore, a number is not reducible to the instances of its representation or use.
The nature of the ‘universe’ remains remarkably elusive regardless of how it is ‘written’ or, more precisely, ‘composed’. There are arbitrary entities, properties and relations that are specific to our universe which have nothing to do to any ‘mathematical’ object or cannot be ‘understood’ mathematically. For example, according to the current standard model, one of the fundamental particles is the quark and there are of three types. However, only one is ‘stable’ and doesn’t decay. When I asked why this is the case to a friend and colleague who extensively studied quantum physics, he just restated: ‘because this is how it is’, which is a short way to say ‘we don’t know and maybe there is nothing to know about it’. The Newtonian law of gravitation expressed in mathematical terms (and not in geometrical forms as he did) states: ((m1·m2)/d2)·g.[4] Now, we know from experience that this is true but it could have been ‘easily’ otherwise. For example, the distance could have been a cube rather than a square and the gravitational constant g could have been 7.45 instead of 9.81 m/s2. The speed of light in a vacuum could have been slightly more or slightly less fast. It is just a fact that its speed is what it is. These can be described through some mathematical notions but the reasons for those numbers to be what they are, if they are correct, is not mathematical at all. In fact, they are incorrect, that is, their measurement can always refine as for example 9.81 is approximation! If this wasn’t the case, then the law of gravitation could have been discovered through pure mathematical reasoning. But as ‘pure mathematical reasoning’ is independent from the physical reality, that discovery would have been, and was, impossible without restricting mathematics to the observable. And this means that this ‘observable’ is not mathematical. Hence, not even this book is composed in full mathematical language.
There is another disturbing property of the physical word that relentlessly resists our capacity to read it through the ‘book of mathematical language’ which vindicate the ancient Greek way of saying that ‘matters will never be reducible to the perfection of the form’. As life will go, and the universe beyond it, this will be always true and a form of eternal truth.[5] There are physical phenomena that cannot be predicted or even modelled mathematically. For example, the sun specific explosions, energy release and light that comes from it cannot be fully anticipated because certain dynamics are not reducible to rules or regularities that we can effectively write down in a series of equations.[6] In other words, those emerging properties are unique and isolated in a way to be unreducible to rules. For this reason, all we can do is to make some statistical and probabilistic analysis to minimize this structural lack of mathematical representation. ‘Statistical and probabilistic analysis’ are mathematical, yes, but are based on ways to record events that are not mathematical in nature and do not yield, again, inferences beyond a certain threshold of certainty or, in other words, they weight the uncertainty rather than establish the certain.[7] Phenomena that are not written in any mathematical language abound in the ‘universe’.[8]
I am restraining myself to consider my arguments laid for war and combat, but worth noting that it is hard to understand how to mathematize history. For example, how can we redescribe a sentence such as ‘Mao’s inclination for communist ideology led him to elaborate the principles of the cultural revolution in modern China’. It is hard to understand what ‘modern China’ means, where it is, what is its boundary, what does include and exclude etc. And, in fact, history is one of the most vague ‘sciences’ around because it deals with statements whose references are almost by definition undeterminable. For example, ‘Caesar intentionally crossed the Rubicon’ is a de dicto or de re attribution of belief and in what terms we can establish that, in his mind, there was such a belief? However, without attributing intentions to single and plural subjects, history would be unwritable and yet there is value in knowledge produced through history. But I do not want to delve into such complex sciences as if the leading argument is debunked for physics, I assume, it will be debunked for all the rest.
Finally, if the universe would be purely mathematical, we would be likely inclined to believe that it is infinite. The fact is that we don’t know and likely we will never know. Niccolò Cusano (1401–1464), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and possibly Einstein argued that the universe is actually infinite (alongside human stupidity, which is also a finite resource regardless).[9] The argument makes sense. If we think to a point outside the boundary of the universe, that point would exist somewhere. But then this ‘somewhere’ would exist and this would be part of the universe as the totality of the existing things (at least assuming Leibniz’s principle of identity). Current physical conceptions establish that, even in accordance with Einstein’s theory of relativity, the universe is expanding, which means that is ‘finite’ as otherwise it would be unclear what ‘expanding’ means. But where is expanding? However, it must be clear that there ‘universe’ might be used in an idiosyncratic or non-ordinary way; namely, to where we can measure matter or energy, so a caveat is granted. What is ungranted is the fact that we can establish whether the universe is infinite or not. And the problem is, of course, that ‘infinity’ in this quantitative sense is a claimed mathematical notion. But as previously established, we cannot attribute to the universe a mathematical property unless observed. Immanuel Kant (1724-1794) tried to prove that this is a prototypical example of an undecidable answer and I agree with him.[10] That’s why I proposed to say that the universe is ‘unexhaustible’, which means that might or might not be infinite, but it would look infinite to us, the observer.[11]
But for our counterargument on Galileo’s theme, this is unimportant. What is important is the established fact that we cannot prove physical property without observable and through purely mathematical arguments using only mathematical objects. We proved this in several independent ways: (a) Galielo’s own statement is not mathematical in nature, (b) physical facts are not mirrored by mathematical objects and properties alone, (c) mathematical proofs do not establish the validity of physical arguments on their own, (d) there are physical facts that are arbitrary and could have been wildly different determining different mathematical representations, and (e) these are not exceptions as not even in the realm of pure infinity we can deduce properties of the world from the properties of what we today understand as ‘mathematics’. And if Galileo could have not known about all mathematical discoveries achieved afterwards, this does not change the fact that he was wrong.
There is No ‘Mathematical Language’, Singular and Even if It Existed, Galileo Didn’t Read It
Galielo gives a short account of what he intended as ‘mathematical objects’. The mathematical objects he listed (‘triangles’, ‘circles’ and ‘geometrical figures’) are specifically geometrical and of specific type (two-dimensional). This is because up to Isaac Newton (1643-1727), geometry was the ‘queen of sciences’ and considered the absolute benchmark of precision. Even when Descartes elaborated or discovered analytic geometry, essentially realizing that equations described geometric objects (which is, according to me, one of the greatest ideas of the history of mathematics), number theory or general numerical mathematics was still too ‘confused’ or ‘messy’ to be considered a fully clarified realm of inquiry and to do something about it will take other three centuries, at least up to the 1930s with the reflections on the fundamental of mathematics and its logical consistency from David Hilbert (1862-1943), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), John Von Neumann (1903-1957), Gerhard Gentzen (1909-1945), Paul Bernays (1888-1970), Kurt Godel among many others.[12] In essence, Galileo didn’t fully realized that the language of the book itself is many different languages which are not all equal to any other as, in other words, the ‘the book is written in mathematical language’ does not mean much as there is no ‘mathematical language’ in this general and universal sense.
One question can be formulated. Even today mathematics is a variety of wildly different branches and, as such, if we consider it as a totality, we might believe that it can be called as the ‘mathematical language’. The answer is negative for the simple reason that we use the word quite liberally and if we would be strict, we would end up with contradictions. Galielo could retort that it would be sufficient to say that there is ‘a’ mathematical language for any given portion of the universe to be described through ‘a’ sub-portion of mathematics. The answer is negative again because now the question is rather how to select the appropriate language, assuming it exists and then on what premise is ‘mathematical’. But we know already (a) that there is no clear criterion for establishing the ‘appropriate language’ and (b) that there are wide portions of the universe that resist mathematical representations. Interestingly, if this wasn’t the case, then we couldn’t even conceptualize those portions of the universe, talk about them or wonder about them. We have just done it, so proving that we can! And we can because we do not resort to ‘mathematics’ for those and we use other non-fully mathematizable tools as imperfect as they might be.
There is an open contention, far beyond Galileo’s time, that mathematics is a language in the first place and the reason is like the rejection of the world as a mathematical object. Gödel was one of those who argued against it.[13] Of course, there have been a variety of philosophers who tried to say that mathematics is logic and, as logic is a particular language, therefore mathematics is also a particular logical language. But then what is not a mathematical language? As we said, however, even restricting to set theory or logics, we shall conclude that mathematics is a wild variety of different languages that do not even naturally translate one into another as some theories might be equivalent but not all of them. But this is a contentious open debate.
For example, if we believe that numbers exist or there is a clear sense in which their properties are fully independent from whatever way we want to describe them, then we might also conclude that this is because they exist independently from the syntax we use to represent them into a given language – whatever its shape. And as after all numbers were universally conceived before any logical representation, we can also be tempted to conclude that they existed independently after all. Moreover, it is a fact that to have a perfectly formalized logical mathematical system specific axioms in the system has to be formulated to mimic numbers and ways to deduce their properties etc., suggesting that if we have to introduce specific axioms in the formalism which, otherwise, can be used for other purposes, then it is legitimate to think that mathematics is independent from pure logics and vice versa. En passant, those systems are not the way through which we really discover numbers and their properties. They rather reassure us that no contractions might arise in case of sound proofs. While this could be not a decisive argument, it remains cogent enough to establish that there is no ‘mathematical language,’ singular, and there is no way to establish which is the best way to find the appropriate portion of it for describing the world as it is. In fact, this is another important point.
Galileo’s point could have been diluted to say that he didn’t really believe it so strongly. What he might mean was rather that that is the best way to ‘understand’ the world as without mathematics ‘one wanders in vain through a dark labyrinth’. Where this ‘dark labyrinth’ is the mind, not the world, in absence of appropriate conceptual tools. This condition is perfectly clear and understandable, but it is also about Galileo or the reader. That is, it is relative to the minds and that’s why it is expressed in natural language. Now, Galileo might have meant that there are no better tools for the mind than using mathematical models, regardless of their universal nature, because all the rest would be highly unsatisfactory leading to the ‘dark labyrinth’. But he just gave an example in which any mathematical proof would have been far longer and more complicated for a very simple fact: without mathematics we cannot understand the world. This is said in seven words! Therefore, there are well established physical facts of some sort whose best description is not mathematical at all. A similar argument applies to war, which cannot be reduced to a complicated formalism because even if we could it would be pointless.[14]
Finally, Galileo assumes that we ‘cannot understand it if we do not first learn the language and grasp the symbols’. But let’s think about the paradox here. If the world is written in mathematical language, why we don’t learn mathematics observing it? It should be rather obvious that given that the ‘symbols are triangles, circles and other geometrical figures’ we should already be excellent mathematicians as we are constantly exposed to all sorts of geometrical figures and their properties. Alas, that’s definitely not the case. Why? Because ultimately the world does not appear as Galileo is describing even assuming that he is thinking at an ‘hidden nature’ of the universe. First, he didn’t say this explicitly and even if he did, then the question is now different: how can we be so sure that the world is superficially not written in mathematical language then and why is instead described in such language for the portions hidden to us? Then, there is already a concession: the ‘hidden nature of the world’ is mathematical but its ‘surface’ (the good old ‘appearances’) are not. But this was exactly what the modern science ‘debunked’: that there is a ‘metaphysical nature’ different from the appearances! Either way, there is something that is not working. And the reason is simple. Because nature is not written in any language!
‘Science’ Does Not See the World in Mathematical Language
We already proved that Galileo’s statement is false regardless of how we want to twist it. Let’s turn now to how ‘science’ sees the world and simply put, ‘science’ does not see the world anyway. Scientists see the world and they do not start with any mathematical dictionary in their hands as they simply learn to talk as anyone else. In this sense, we justify what David Hume (1711-1776), Willard V.O. Quine (1908-2000), Karl Popper (1902-1994) and others argued, that is, ‘science’ starts with ‘common sense’ or ordinary empirical observations whose record is established through our natural language. Hence, any scientist starts before any mathematical understanding of the world by definition. And even when they start, they never terminate to think in non-mathematical terms. For example, let’s take Einstein’s:
“In your schooldays most of you who read this book made acquaintance with the noble building of Euclid’s geometry, and you remember — perhaps with more respect than love — the magnificent structure, on the lofty staircase of which you were chased about for uncounted hours by conscientious teachers. By reason of your past experience, you would certainly regard every one with disdain who should pronounce even the most out-of-the-way proposition of this science to be untrue. But perhaps this feeling of proud certainty would leave you immediately if some one were to ask you: “What, then, do you mean by the assertion that these propositions are true?” Let us proceed to give this question a little consideration.”[15]
It is ironic that Einstein starts from this very point in his Relativity – The Special and General Theory and it takes quite a bit of space to arrive to a first equation! And he agrees that geometry does not provide a direct connection with the real world: “The concept “true” does not tally with the assertions of pure geometry, because by the word “true” we are eventually in the habit of designating always the correspondence with a “real” object; geometry, however, is not concerned with the relation of the ideas involved in it to objects of experience, but only with the logical connection of these ideas among themselves.”[16] The very first chapter is indeed a reply to a sort of an argument like the one you are reading. As Einstein seems already conceding that to explain the ‘mathematical book’ what is required is a non-purely mathematical language, we should look for some more ‘hard core’ work:
“Dirac introduced the symbol |ψi, pronounced ‘ket psi’, to denote a complete set of amplitudes for the system. If the system consists of a particle trapped in a potential well, |ψi could consist of the amplitudes an that the energy is En, where (E1, E2, . . .) is the spectrum of possible energies, or it might consist of the amplitudes ψ(x) that the particle is found at x, or it might consist of the amplitudes a(p) that the momentum is measured to be p.”[17]
Now, finally, it seems something difficult to understand enough to make sense and all those symbols resemble what we think must be mathematical language. However, notice how the authors use non-mathematical language for introducing the notation. What they are doing is the painstaking effort to explain every single part of the ‘mathematical’ notation they will use later, but in so doing, they are firstly restricting the meanings of the words in that specific context where ‘energy’ is used in a non-ordinary sense (e.g. they are not saying that ‘energy’ is the outburst of emotional positive reaction to ‘the spectrum of possible energies’).
Can this painstaking work be avoided? Yes, if we would know in advance how the partially mathematical symbols are intended to be used and, in fact, this is false as otherwise they wouldn’t do it. Therefore, both Einstein’s Relativity and this textbook of Quantum Physics do not start with ‘mathematical language’ but they ‘arrive’ to something that looks more mathematical, while never eliminating the residual physical and observational component as both examples clearly states: “By reason of your past experience…” and “Dirac introduced the symbol (…) to denote a set of amplitudes for the system”. It seems to me a platitude that if we have to invent a partially formal language, we did not have that formal language before our natural language and our general observations about the world. Ironically, Galileo most famous and scientifically relevant thought experiments on inertial movement are all but mathematical as they consist in natural language ‘virtual reality’ in which he expresses a hypothesis proving then result through perfectly qualitative and ordinary means.[18]
Now, we are assuming that science is ‘physics’, as Galileo intended his metaphor for that purpose. But why should we believe that ‘science’ is indeed restricted to physics? We should not and, then, a fortiori, he was even more wrong. But even when restricting ourselves to physics or chemistry or biology, all disciplines that come with a strong formalist apparatus, we have already seen that they do not alter our pre-mathematical conception and understanding of the world.
What mathematics does is much more modest and it consists of to remove the noise from portions of the world we are investigating through a simplified model that works exactly because isolated and described through limited, but specified, linguistic means deprived of the normal ambiguity and vagueness of natural language to the bare minimum. When they work, if they work, it is not for some special mathematical mystique but because they have isolated the right properties of the world in a way that their descriptions match the expectations whose validity is tested through experimental reasoning and previous and subsequent testing. There is nothing special about the formalism other than the gains in clarity of our mental instruments which are more efficient than otherwise.
Finally, science, whatever it might mean, is not and should not be restricted to the formalism used in sub-portions of it exactly because it would lose everything we can understand and learn from the non-mathematical true knowledge we have. And as this ‘true knowledge’ is by far vaster and more important than anything else, as formalism starts with it, we should just conclude that Galileo’s book is closed once and for all.
Conclusions – Nature is Not Written in Any Language
I have nothing against Galileo, beyond the fact that he is sanctified among the holy figures of modern science regardless of all the inevitable inaccurate statements of his philosophy of science. But nobody can question Galileo for his hagiographers and proselytes, who have the much stronger burden than the original scientist. Only in an (pseudo-middle) age detached from any accountability one can accuse somebody dead centuries ago of all the unintentional consequences of their theories and conceptions. As for this essay, I will conclude stating clearly what is my positive take away. Very simply, that nature is not written in any language. It is us, the humans, who, using our intellectual categories and their cognitive methods, arrived to understand that mathematics can serve us well in certain specific conditions when describing the world and it is pretty much useless in any other circumstance.[19] As everything else, mathematics is neither perfect nor universally applicable.
There are situations in which mathematical consequences are validated by subsequent testing and experimentation and, when they are not, they are discharged or lead to readjustments in our specific description or general understanding of the phenomenon described. Given the evidence I can understand and contemplate, what seems to me is that we will never escape natural language, observation and reasoning for our knowledge of the world simply because any other language is introduced, defined, restricted and tested back by them. Therefore, concluding that because we are limited and flawed, because we are ‘sinners and evil’, then we should just redeem ourselves creating a perfect parallel universe of symbols and rules where everything works seems to be at best childish and, at worst, pointless. We are who we are, and we are those able to understand the world better as long as we do not fall in misconceptions or pretend to go beyond what is reasonable, including blindly trusting any formalism as the word of God who, in fact, forgot and never gave us a single equation. It might have been a mistake, but we cannot change the past as, indeed, not even God can, if God exist at all.[20]
[1] See GoodReads: https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/28019-philosophy-nature-is-written-in-that-great-book-which-ever and Oxford Reference: https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191866692.001.0001/q-oro-ed6-00004705
[2] We shall come back to this argument again below as critical as it is.
[3] Pili, G., “Cosa ne pensava davvero Kurt Gödel?”, Scuola Filosofica, (2015), available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/4831/cosa-ne-pensava-davvero-kurt-godel, Gödel K., (1951), “Alcuni teoremi basilari sui fondamenti della matematica e le loro implicazioni filosofiche”, in Gödel K., (1995), Scritti scelti, Bollati Boringhieri, Milano.
[4] Where m1 is the first object’s mass, m2 the second object’s mass, d2 is the distance to two between the two and g is the gravitational constant.
[5] Pili, G., “La storia come libera creazione delle verità eterne”, Scuola Filosofica, (2017), available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/5915/5915
[6] This was reported by: Landgrebe, J., “Why adding ontologies to LLMs won’t yield machine intelligence”, Barry Smith – YouTube Channel, (2026), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ce-cN5Llaz4
[7] Helm, R., “Towards a clarification of probability,
possibility and plausibility,” Foresight, VOL. 8 NO. 3 2006, pp. 17-27, available at: https://cspo.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/read_van-der-Helm-Towards-a-Clarification-of-Probability.pdf
[8] Smith, B., “Why AI Will Not Steal Your Job” Barry Smith – YouTube Channel, (2026), available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3JzCFtc9YmU
[9] Not even in stupidity we can claim generality!
[10] See Pili, G., “Capire la “Critica della ragion pura” di Immanuel Kant”, Scuola Filosofica (2019), available at: https://www.academia.edu/38740822/Capire_la_Critica_della_ragion_pura_di_Immanuel_Kant
[11] Pili, G., “On the understandability of the universe and the a priori proof of the existence of God”, Scuola Filosofica, (2023), available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/11429/proof-of-the-existence-of-god
[12] Rathjen, M., Sieg, W., “Proof Theory”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/proof-theory/>
[13] Gödel K., (1953/59), “La matematica è sintassi del linguaggio?”, in Gödel K., (1995), Scritti scelti, Bollati Boringhieri, Milano.
[14] I argued this point explicitly in Pili, G., Filosofia Pura della Guerra, Rome: Aracne 2015, Part II, Chap. 5.
[15] Einstein, A., Relativity: The Special and General Theory, OnlineBooks 1920, p.1, available at: https://www.ibiblio.org/ebooks/Einstein/Einstein_Relativity.pdf
[16] Ibid.
[17] Binney, J., Skinner, D., “The Physics of Quantum Mechanics”, Cappella Publishing, (2008-2013), available at: https://www-thphys.physics.ox.ac.uk/people/JamesBinney/qb.pdf
[18] Maudlin, T., Philosophy of Physics – Space and Time, (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2012).
[19] I love mathematics and its inutility, which is a proof that something good and useless exist in this life.
[20] Pili, G., “On the understandability of the universe and the a priori proof of the existence of God”, Scuola Filosofica, (2023), available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/11429/proof-of-the-existence-of-god



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