Giangiuseppe Pili (2019): Intelligence and Social Epistemology – Toward a Social Epistemological Theory of Intelligence, Social Epistemology, DOI: 10.1080/02691728.2019.1658823
Yes, I know what you are thinking: “Pili stroke again! I cannot miss it!” Indeed, it is my first publication in a Q1 Journal of Philosophy, one of the best in the Social Epistemology field. Social Epistemology is a autoritative journal of philosophy. But this is not the real point. The point is that this is a first attempt toward a social epistemological theory of intelligence in a philosophical journal. It is my third paper on the epistemology of intelligence (after Epistemology and Intelligence – Some philosophical problems to be solved and Intelligence and social knowledge – A philosophical inquiring on the social epistemological nature of intelligence as a state institution) and this marks a real progress toward what I think a real epistemological theory of intelligence should be. Then, follow the progress if you like this project and don’t miss the next step of this exciting research project! Finally, if you want the gist of the paper, please, feel free to write me at scuolafilosofica_AT_gmail.com!
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Evidence, beliefs, and knowledge are words that are currently used in the intelligence community. The primary goal of intelligence is to provide knowledge and foreknowledge of an enemy’s intentions and behavior. Social epistemology considers how organizations and societies (group agents) form beliefs and knowledge. Social epistemology provides powerful tools to investigate intelligence. Indeed, intelligence studies are not focused on epistemological problems, although intelligence is a social epistemic activity. Even if scholars agree that intelligence is valuable because it speaks the truth to the policy-maker, an epistemological theory of intelligence is still far from formulated. I will provide a general account of intelligence agencies to make a first attempt toward a social epistemological theory of intelligence.