And there it was God – Understanding the a priori proof of existence
Anybody who tried to understand and replicate the a priori proof of the existence of God should have experienced both a sense of wonder and distrust. The wonder comes from recognizing the power of reason, able to formulate a proposition about the world that, if thinkable, should be true for its only being formulable. Namely, the truth-value of that special statement must be true in force only of its being thinkable. This cannot be as a major cause of wonder! Indeed, how many times we formulate propositions in our mind that, then, just turn to be merely possible and, if true, in force of their match to something external to them, usually some conditions in nature or any other realm to which the proposition applies (e.g., numbers). Humans as we are, we spend time thinking about possibilities, different situations, counterfactuals, and how the world can be nicer to us or how our soulmate looks. And we forget that among those speculations, there are some special that actually turn out to be true only for their own nature of being formulable.
However, thinking through the argument of the necessary existence of God, the feeling of distrust should immediately follow. How can we be so sure that our reason is indeed so incredibly capable of such a formulation. It looks like an act of magic which is obviously a trick for the senses. It cannot be true, could it be?
Personally, I was on the side of the distrust. Though a rationalist,[1] I never believed that the simple formulation of a proposition could ever determine such a deep consequence, the demonstration of an existent entity outside the mind itself, the specific and proper realm of reason. In short, the proof of the a priori existence of God could be simplified and outlined as follows:
An entity that includes all the properties of perfection must include existence as one of them. Therefore, if such an entity is thinkable, it must exist. This entity is thinkable, then it exists. This entity is God.
Naturally, this argument is limited in what it states. It does not say what kind of God we are talking about if this God has a will or not etc. Indeed, versions of this argument were accepted by philosophers who defended a creationist God[1] and their opponents, who accepted God without Its[2] being a creator.[3] This shows just how agnostic this argument is in religious terms. Actually, as I argued elsewhere, no real religious person, whatever the faith, should believe in the soundness of the argument because if the argument is correct, then no faith is required to believe in God, which is a postulate (a dogma) of any major monotheist religion.[4] This would bring us too far, so I will avoid elaborating further on this digression. So, let’s come back to the argument.
A sort of paraphrasis of its intention will suit the reader, who could be confused by it, which is quite understandable. The goal is to demonstrate the existence of an entity often labeled as God, whose main features are all part of Its perfection. That God must be somehow perfect is indirectly inferred because of its powers (omnipotence and omniscience). But also because otherwise, contradictions about Its nature would start to come up.[5] Any restriction on God’s capacity would count as an imperfection, directly denied by Its main features and by Its perfection. Therefore, if such an entity would exist, it must exist as infinite and perfect. Now, and this is where the argument steps in, if such a thing is assumed as possible, we are also forced to assume Its features as described, the first of which Its perfection. And here is the crucial step of the argument: if God is so infinite and perfect, it must include ‘existence’ as one of Its properties; otherwise, It would not be as perfect. Namely, though omniscience and omnipotence are Its primary properties, and the source of Its perfection, it could still lack the property of being existing. But this must be absurd because if such an entity does not exist, It would not be as perfect as Its features require. And this is a contradiction. If an entity could be defined in such a way, it must exist; otherwise, its definition would be contradictory. But there is no apparent contradiction in the definition; therefore, we should assume this entity as existing.
Another way to think about the proof is in equivalent logical terms but slightly different in its formulation. If God is thinkable, It must exist. God is thinkable; therefore, it must exist. I can imagine (think) an entity whose properties include infinite power. I can think of it. How difficult it is to give a shape or color to It does not matter. There is clearly a sense, quite abstract but not less real, in which I can think of such an entity. But if I think it possible, then I must also irresistibly conclude that it must be real and existing. In fact, how could I think about such a powerful entity not existing? It wouldn’t be as powerful! A super-powerful entity that does not include its own existence looks quite power-less to me, and that’s probably why I never found very entertaining any form of American-superhero, as they look quite weak and powerless to me (in fact, they don’t even exist, sorry for the spoiler).[6] Instead, I find it more fascinating to think about God in these terms. It looks much more powerful to me; therefore, it seems to exist, or, at the very least, I must think about It.[7]
But how can we be sure that the argument is not flawed? Is it possible to deduce the existence of such an entity only from its being formulable? It must look like magic to any sensible person (the insensible persons, well, they know better, or they don’t know anything at all!) Before turning to the argument again, I want to introduce you to another theme, which should have been the only one in this post, but it turned out to be complementary and not the only actor of the scene. I will present you an argument that, instead, convinced me of its cogency for its only being it formulable. To say it differently, its being formulable only within the mind’s boundaries sheds incredible light on the nature of reality itself.
On understanding – And why the universe is regular to some extent
Reading Ludwig Von Mises‘ masterpiece, Human Action, I realized that all his praxeology is grounded on one single principle, which is what Mises called “human understanding.” It is a premise of all the treatise and its argument that human reason can understand the world, meaning to somehow recreate the causal relationships between entities that exist and act in the world. However, as far as I remember, the proof of this possibility is not given by Mises and, after all, rightly so, as he was trying to shed light on the essential nature of economy and human-economic interaction, not on some general features of the human mind. But all masterpieces have the power and property to go far beyond their purpose, and this is no exception.
I developed an argument that, to me, seems so real and incredible to look like magical. In fact, the argument is purely a priori, and it goes as follows. Or reason is able to understand at least pieces of the world, or it is not. If it is not, then this simple assertion would be impossible. But the formulation of rational understanding is just stated; therefore, it is possible. It is a factual statement in itself; therefore, it is possible by definition, as any fact is possible, especially when it exists. Therefore, understanding is possible because it is formulable. In addition, if it is formulable, it is because it is thinkable through a linguistic act produced by the mind. There is no question that my mind exists (if I think, my mind necessarily exists);[8] therefore, there is no question that it can think because I am proving even to you, reader, that I am thinking at least now. However, if the mind can exert such a linguistic action (the formulation of the possibility of human understanding), and it does, it directly follows that there are rules through which my mind is able to formulate this proposition. The proposition itself is proof of its producibility and, as a result, of the regularity required by the process of linguistic production. These are the (many) rules of language, constrained by the rules of logic and embodied somehow by the psychological rules of the mind. Therefore, there is for sure at least one at least partial regular entity in the universe, and this is my mind. And with this statement, we proved the point. If human understanding is possible, it is necessary to some extent.
I want to reiterate my sense of wonder for this argument. It shows that pure a priori reasoning can follow a statement that is (must be?) true for the entire universe and specifically states that the universe must be regular to a certain extent. Now, this is already incredible to me because the argument just requires my capacity to think of it for making a very far-reaching consideration about the entire universe or reality. Moreover, we can then build up on it. For instance, we can start to ask how such an entity (my mind) can think and exist. As it is not able to change reality by its own thinking alone, as it is not even able to survive by itself (apparently), we can say that something bigger and more powerful than my mind must also be in place exactly because my mind exists. I cannot think my mind in a vacuum etc. Though less convincingly, I can generalize to others’ minds. If there is at least another mind like mine, then it must be regular at least when it acts similarly.
The structure of the argument is the following:
| 1 | The universe is not regular. | Postulate |
| 2 | 2.1 I can formulate the question, “Is the universe not regular?”
OR
2.2 I can formulate the question “I want to know the truth value of (1) |
Formulation of (1) through a linguistic act in the mind. My thinking of it and writing it down show its formulation as an existing act. |
| Therefore | ||
| 3 | I formulate the question, “Is the universe not regular?” (Equivalent to 2.2) | Proved by the existence of (2). |
| 4 | The formulation of a question requires a rule to allow the formulation itself. | Proved by (2), as otherwise impossible. |
| Therefore | ||
| 5 | Not “The universe is not regular.” | Proved by (4) |
| Therefore | ||
| 6 | The universe is regular | Convers of (1) proved by (5) |
I wanted to outline the structure of the argument itself to show how it works under an informal natural deduction. In conclusion, the sheer question of understandability proves that the universe is regular to some extent and, therefore, understandable. In what is this argument similar to God’s proof of existence?
The most important feature of both arguments is their capacity to transcend time, space, and even the cause of their existence. In fact, wherever and whenever they are formulated, if they are formulable and actually formulated, they must be applicable to any time and any space. But more importantly, though both are formulated only speculatively, namely inside a mind, their application is immediately applied to all reality. They also share another feature: their abstract nature does not grant them to be very specific. Let’s take the last one considered.
What do we know now that we didn’t know before? That actually the super-skeptics are wrong, as they only prove the same point through their criticisms of human understanding (meaning, if they formulate the question, they must admit immediately that the universe is regular and understandable to a certain extent). Also, it helps reassure us that trying to understand the universe is not an empty endeavor (and now we can prove it). Interestingly, it proves another important feature of the human capacity to reach the world. If understanding is possible, and if the universe is regular to a certain extent, then the world is predictable to a certain extent. This is another important achievement! It shows that the future must be, to a certain extent, like the past. Again, how similar is a totally different story, but it still must be similar because it is regular, and regularity is transmitted through time. In fact, one can even start to think that the notion of time itself is only a consequence of the regularity of the universe, meaning that the rules that dominate the universe do apply eternally (or they are not subjected to the flow of time). Now, Hume famously stated that our understanding of causality will always be bounded to a certain degree of uncertainty and to the fact that our predictions are limited by the assumption of the regularity of nature. However, at least in very general terms, now we have a reply to this problem. The universe is predictable to a certain extent. And I have a secondary argument based on the former.
If the statement ‘the universe is absolutely unpredictable’ or ‘no predictions are possible’ we are making a prediction, because it states that any statement about the future will turn to be false or, at least, epistemologically unjustified (then, they also imply the destruction of any epistemology). But the statement itself is a prediction, and therefore the argument is self-defeating as if it is true, it is false. In a word, the absolute unpredictability of the universe is a formulable statement whose truth-value is false exactly in force of its meaning.[9] Therefore, as the universe is understandable to some extent, for the same and a parallel reason, it is also predictable. Negating both propositions is contradictory, therefore, both converse statements must be true and they are.
Coming back to God – Final observations on the proof of the existence of God
Since I read the proof of the existence of God and Immanuel Kant’s counterargument to it, I was convinced that God is possible (from Saint Anselm), and therefore it is only possible (from Kant).[10] However, I want to go a step on my own conception using the theory of free formulation of eternal truths, my own philosophical understanding of the world.[11] The argument is the following.
There are two horns of the problem of the existence of God. On one side, there is the existence of an entity so perfect to be impossible to deny Its existence. If It is thinkable, It is possible, and if possible, It is necessary. On another side, there is the recognition of the fact that we are not able to think of It because Its thinkability goes beyond reason’s own capacity. It is formulable, but our reason does not go so far as to be able to grasp it. In this sense, the proof is only apparent insofar we can formulate it but not understand it. This was the ultimate Kant’s argument which is, in my opinion, correct. There is clearly a sense in which we cannot prove such an entity existing because of the limitation of human understanding. We believe we are understanding the notion of God’s perfection and infinity, but we are not. And in this regard, religions are safe to propose their visions as nobody can prove them true or false.[12] However, the proof is not entirely wrong in another sense.
In fact, we can limit the applicability of the proof to a more humane conception of understanding: “An entity that includes all the properties of perfection must include existence as one of them. Therefore, if such an entity is thinkable, it must exist. This entity is thinkable; then it must exist.” Instead of taking the proof in its maximalist version, we can interpret it in a limited way. Kant is right in pointing out that the first statement of the argument is formulable. He is also right in denying the soundness of the second step (if It is thinkable, then…). However, he is right only if we pretend to think of an absolute infinite entity, absolutely omniscient and omnipotent. The problem is ‘infinity’. However, as proved through our argument of human understanding, and Kant’s fully explicit this point, we know there is something called ‘universe’ or ‘reality’, which is inexhaustible by reason. We don’t know if the universe is infinite, but it looks infinite to us; namely, epistemically, we cannot exhaust it, and metaphysically, it is autonomous. Moreover, we know that we cannot sustain ourselves alone; where instead, there is a reality that sustains us, and that does not require us to exist (Kant calls this ‘reality’ noumenon, as we can assume its existence but not knowing its consistency and reality). Therefore, the proof of God works in a depowered version of the entity supposed to exist.
Depowered Version – An epistemically inexhaustible entity, metaphysically independent and physically sustaining human existence is possible. Therefore, if such an entity is thinkable, it must exist. This entity is thinkable; then it must exist.“
This argument is much less powerful as it does not make explicit the nature of such an entity, and it does not pretend to extend the limit of reason. Conversely, if reason exists, something else must make it possible. However, the new formulation of the proof seems to me a universally clear and distinct statement. In fact, it seems to me it captures exactly what the proof of the existence of God is trying to describe: a required entity for explaining human existence postulated from the only insights of the mind. As paradoxical as it may sound, this depowered conception of the proof of the existence of God seems to capture what Spinoza conceived, one of the most extreme interpreters of this proof. Though Spinoza pushed reason too far and assumed too much, his vision of the infinite substance tries to capture the problem of explaining the general existence of the universe vis a vis limited things or “modus”, such as houses, planets, stars, protons, and human beings. His definition of the universe, infinite substance, or God was, in fact, what is ‘existing without requiring anything else for its own existence’.[13] It just exists, and everything else must exist in it.
Now, my proposal is far weaker, but there is no question that human understanding as such is built around the same principle: that there must be something bigger, indestructible by us, independent and united, that makes us possible. This same principle can be (and was) formulated innumerable ways, but all capture the same idea that something bigger than us is required for us to exist and, as far as it is thinkable, it must exist. This looks to me like another of those eternal truths that makes us, humans, the unsecured voice of it when, freed from the trouble of life, we spend one moment of rest to think about how incredible this reality is, so bigger than us and, yet, understandable.
[1] So naturally inclined to believe and trust reason as such, as in the old classic modern understanding of the word ‘rationalist.’
[2] I am using the “It” pronoun, first to avoid any reference to any religion and second because it is quite a different argument proving the existence of God and its gender. This topic is not so philosophically cogent and I will live it to anybody interested. Moreover, as argued in the text, God can compatible with a non-free entity without any will.
[3] Famously, Spinoza is probably the clearer case.
[4] See Pili, G., (2011), “Spiegazione della prova ontologica di San Anselmo”, Scuola Filosofica, https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/427/spiegazione-della-prova-ontologica-di-san-anselmo.
[5] For instance, if such infinite entity is not perfect, then it is not really infinite or why does It allow anything else to exist etc.
[6] I argued elsewhere that Batman is not existing and that’s why I appreciated several movies on the character, see Pili, G., (2018), “Life as an Open-Ended act of La trilogia di Christopher Nolan – Ovvero Batman come il Cristo americano,” Scuola Filosofica, https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/6162/la-trilogia-christopher-nolan-ovvero-batman-cristo-americano
[7] For instance, Pili, G., (2011), “Il paradosso della teologia negativa”, Scuola Filosofica, https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/534/il-paradosso-della-teologia-negativa
[8] This is famously proved by René Descartes, see Pili, G., (2011), “Renato Cartesio – Vita e le Meditazioni Metafisiche”, Scuola Filosofica, https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/661/descartes
[9] The formulation of the unpredictability of the world, essentially proves the converse proposition.
[10] See Pili, G., (2019), “Capire la “Critica della ragion pura” di Immanuel Kant”, Academia.Edu, https://www.academia.edu/38740822/Capire_la_Critica_della_ragion_pura_di_Immanuel_Kant
[11] See Pili, G., (2017), “La storia come libera creazione delle verità eterne,” Scuola Filosofica, https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/5915/5915.
[12] For such analysis, see Pili, G., (2023) “Creation – Or Why Life is Unsolvable”, Scuola Filosofica, https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/11416/why-life-is-unsolvable
[13] My formulation of Spinoza’s definition of substance.
Giangiuseppe Pili
Il tuo articolo – in particolare, la frase conclusiva – mi ha richiamato alla mente un noto aforisma espresso da Albert Einstein in Pensieri degli anni difficili (1950): «La cosa più incomprensibile dell’universo è il fatto che esso sia comprensibile». Einstein considerava questo fatto una sorta di «miracolo»…
Sinceramente, io non trovo così strano che l’universo risulti comprensibile agli esseri umani. D’altronde, a differenza di Einstein io credo nel Dio della Bibbia, un Dio personale e provvidente, che ama “manifestare” Sé Stesso e le Sue opere agli esseri umani. Come scrisse Blaise Pascal nel suo Memoriale (1654), il Dio della Bibbia «non» si può ridurre a quello «dei filosofi e dei dotti»…
Caro Giorgio,
Grazie per il commento. Ovvero, per i tre commenti che si trovano dentro.
[a] “Sinceramente, io non trovo così strano che l’universo risulti comprensibile agli esseri umani.” con riferimento ad Einstein. Beh, ci sono due osservazioni. La prima riguarda la dimostrabilità o la provabilità della comprensibilità. Un mio amico, che stranamente ha letto il testo, mi ha detto “tu sei come i politici, alla fine non dici niente di nuovo”. Questo è assolutamente vero (e scritto al principio dell’articolo) ed irrilevante, perché tutti possono formulare frasi come vogliono, ma provarle è un’altra cosa. O anche provarle e fallire nella prova è un’altra cosa. Il punto della comprensibilità, a mio giudizio, se non dovesse stupire il fatto che il mondo sia comprensibile, dovrebbe però stupire il come non lo sia. Ma per i miei molto modesti problemi, lo stupore maggiore nasce dal fatto che la comprensibilità è necessaria per la formulazione stessa del problema e questo si dimostra a priori. Da lì molte conseguenze, inderivabili con altrettanta certezza senza la solida condizione di provabilità.
[b] “D’altronde, a differenza di Einstein io credo nel Dio della Bibbia, un Dio personale e provvidente, che ama “manifestare” Sé Stesso e le Sue opere agli esseri umani.” Naturalmente, ognuno ha diritto a sposare ciò che ritiene in linea con le proprie credenze. Tuttavia, il fatto stesso che esistano multipli punti di vista religiosi, tema trattato proprio nel post precedente, https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/11416/why-life-is-unsolvable, dimostra l’insolubilità (della non univoca solubilità) del problema della vita. In ultima analisi, proprio il fatto di avere più religioni e infinite versioni delle stesse (o finite ma infinitamente rivedibili o reiterpretabili) mostra il fatto quasi letterale che allora ognuno la può vedere come vuole, ma con dei limiti precisi (per altro lì esplorati). E in ultima analisi, tu puoi anche credere in una delle possibili interpretazioni del “Dio della Bibbia”, ma purtroppo tutto si ferma là per quanto riguarda l’estendibilità del concetto a terzi a meno di cercare di far capire cosa ciò appunto dovrebbe significare.
[c] “Come scrisse Blaise Pascal nel suo Memoriale (1654), il Dio della Bibbia «non» si può ridurre a quello «dei filosofi e dei dotti»” Grazie per citare Pascal e questo specifico punto perché mi consente, forse per la prima volta, di esporre un ragionamento che ho elaborato tempo fa. Primo, Pascal era sia un filosofo sia un dotto. Quindi la stessa frase dovrebbe essere “Il Dio della Bibbia – non – si può ridurre a quello dei filosofi e dei dotti” & “Anche la frase precedente è a sua volta il risultato di una riduzione di un filosofo e dotto”. Questo ha come conseguenza che anche Pascal e le sue visioni di Dio, in quanto o dotto o filosofo (innegabilmente almeno una delle due proprietà), vanno quindi considerate alla luce della sua stessa limitazione. Questo lo dico perché ho sempre trovato paradossale, se non proprio incomprensibile, proprio quanto Pascal diceva. Tuttavia, di Pascal so molto poco e non ho mai esplorato a sufficienza il suo pensiero, quindi non farò un passo in più nel considerare una riduzione di quello che, spero, sia un migliore argomento di quello che appare.
Secondo, non capisco (in virtù della capacità di capire e ragionare) questa sorta di rigetto per le posizioni filosofiche in materia. Alcune sembrano appropriate, ad esempio Tommaso d’Aquino o Agostino sono considerati filosofi, direi abbastanza giustamente. E certamente almeno Tommaso, sicuramente un super-dotto. Quindi, la scure Pascaliana dovrebbe abbattersi anche sulle loro teste? Non credo, ma come fare a dire di no? Secondo, e più importante, non riesco proprio a capire perché proprio i filosofi o i dotti dovrebbero venire esclusi o “ridotti” a loro volta. In fondo, passano ore, giorni, mesi e anni a pensare a questi problemi, perché non li si dovrebbe prendere senza riduzioni?
Naturalmente, proprio per argomenti filosofici già considerati recentemente, non mi sento di ritornare su un punto a me evidente e già difeso: ognuno deve essere libero di pensarla (religiosamente) come meglio ritiene e io sarò là a difendere il suo diritto e principio di farlo. Tuttavia, ed esattamente per le stesse ragioni, mi sento anche di sostenere il diritto dei filosofi a ragionare su queste questioni con il riconoscimento che, se si vuole fare filosofia, le regole di ingaggio sono quelle della filosofia stessa, con tutte le conseguenze del caso.
Grazie, caro Giorgio come sempre degli stimolanti commenti che mi han dato l’opportunità di esplorare alcuni punti non toccati nel testo.
Giangiuseppe
Giangiuseppe,
grazie della risposta, riguardo alla quale ti presento una breve replica.
Punto [a]. Ho notato che la tua dimostrazione della comprensibilità dell’universo (o, quantomeno, di parti di esso) si fonda sulla Logica classica, in cui il valore di verità di una proposizione può essere 1 (proposizione vera) oppure 0 (proposizione falsa).
E se invece facessimo riferimento a un altro tipo di Logica, ad esempio la Logica fuzzy (ovvero Logica sfumata), che è una Logica polivalente in cui il valore di verità di un’asserzione può essere un qualunque numero reale appartenente all’intervallo [0, 1]? In tale Logica, fra l’altro, non sono validi i principi classici di non contraddizione e del terzo escluso.
Punto [b]. Tu hai parlato, giustamente, di diverse «possibili interpretazioni del Dio della Bibbia» quali, di fatto, si sono estrinsecate nel corso dei secoli (basti pensare alle differenze, inerenti a certi aspetti del Divino, esistenti fra le varie confessioni cristiane).
Proprio per questo motivo io ho voluto utilizzare una caratterizzazione minimale del Dio biblico, una caratterizzazione ammissibile, credo, nell’ambito di qualsivoglia fede religiosa che si basi sulla Bibbia – intesa, evidentemente, come l’unione dell’Antico e del Nuovo Testamento.
Punto [c]. Blaise Pascal scrisse il Memoriale in un momento, direi, di “illuminazione mistica” (usa infatti termini quali «Fuoco», «Certezza», «Sentimento», «Gioia», «Pace»…). Il Dio dei filosofi e dei dotti da lui menzionato è, sinteticamente, il Dio degli Assoluti (la Causa Prima, l’Essere Supremo, l’Idea Assoluta, la Legge Eterna, ecc.).
D’altra parte, tu hai ricordato che anche Pascal è un filosofo e un dotto (in matematica, fisica, ecc.). Come ha sostenuto il presbitero e teologo cattolico Romano Guardini in Pascal (1935), per lui «il mondo resta il mondo; la filosofia resta la filosofia; ma tutto viene assorbito in un nuovo complesso e al pensiero viene richiesto un nuovo sforzo per la consapevolezza che quel Dio, che il filosofo intende come l’Assoluto, è in realtà il Dio vivo che entra nella storia nella persona di Gesù Cristo; e il rapporto dell’uomo verso Dio, che la dottrina filosofica dell’esistenza concepisce come rapporto con l’Assoluto, è in realtà la vita del chiamato da Dio tesa verso il Dio vivo».
Ciao Giorgio,
Grazie del follow up. Dunque, in breve, che alternativamente bisogna scrivere un altro saggio per le digressioni e si finisce per perdere di riferimento il testo.
[a] Non sono convinto che ci sia alcuna assunzione esplicita di riferimento per quanto riguarda la tipologia di logica assunta per la prova di San Anselmo e, per estensione, simili prove. Inoltre, il cambiamento ad una logica polivalente non cambia la natura dell’argomento in ogni caso perché semplicemente istanziato nei casi estremi considerati da quella logica. Quando si hanno argomenti categorici, la logica fuzzy credo reagisca esattamente negli stessi termini della logica classica. E infatti/comunque non penso che questo cambi la validità dell’argomento. Per una prova con una logica modale, Godel aveva usato S5, mi pare. Ma non penso che spostare il problema a quale logica usare sia particolarmente cogente perché si tratta comunque di un argomento di natura semantica e quindi non interamente riducibile ad un discorso di quantificatori e connettivi e pure regole di deduzione, assumendo appunto che le deduzioni siano corrette e consentite.
[b] Non lo so cosa sia in questo campo il “minimale”. Ma il punto è che anche nel minimale si possono interpretare le stesse parole e cose in modo diverso. Su questo punto, inoltre, dato che il testo non aveva riferimento a tale problema, né ragione di digressione, credo che abbiamo esaurito il punto.
[c] Come detto, non avendo argomenti contrari, rimango ancora del parere che bisogna prendere i “dotti e i filosofi” sul serio anche quando parlano di dio/Dio. E Pascal come uno di essi. Né più né meno degli altri, per altro. D’altra parte, se non si fosse sentito il bisogno di esplorare tale argomento in termini logico-filosofici, non si sarebbe fatto. Se altri hanno altre esigenze di altra natura, non mi pare ci siano restrizioni di stile e gusti. E d’altra parte non a tutti piace o interessa la filosofia anche per questi temi.
Grazie ancora e spero che questi commenti possano essere di ausilio a chiarire dei punti per altri lettori del testo.
Giangiuseppe
Giangiuseppe,
intervengo nuovamente per ricambiarti il saluto e ricordare che quest’anno ricorre il quarto centenario della nascita di Pascal (Clermont-Ferrand, 19 giugno 1623 – Parigi, 19 agosto 1662).
Colgo l’occasione anche per inserire un trailer relativo alla miniserie TV Blaise Pascal, diretta da Roberto Rossellini (1972), nella cui ultima parte il protagonista illustra la celebre “scommessa” – un’argomentazione che, pur criticata da vari pensatori, conserva nondimeno un valore razionale, oltreché strettamente religioso.