Humans purposefully act every day and all the time. They act differently, however, every single time, as they are all immersed in a changing environment.[1] As such, all actions are different, at least, according to time, where ‘time’ here is intended as conventional and landscape-time (meaning, the natural flow of events).[2] Instead, from a human perspective, it is the action taken that determines the perception of time flow and the related awareness and meaning of time change.[3] This is a flat way to understand different types of actions, however, because the order in which actions are executed does not tell anything about their different nature, that is, the type of causal events they are immersed and part of in relation to some desired effect to be determined.
As Ludwig von Mises argued, human action is based on the premise of change: “Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into agency, is aiming at ends and goals (…) [human action] is a person’s conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life.”[4] Although all actions are taken according to specific dispositional belief, that is, according to a given intention formulable in a sentence in which the factual components indicate the desired state of affairs to be reached,[5] they can be classified according to what piece of reality they are intended to bring change.
Preconditions and Premises for Understandability of Human Actions
The best way to understand the different typologies of actions is to divide them into causal/effect categories. Any purposeful human action is rationally calculated in function of given desired effects intended to be reachable through a given intention to be fully translated into the realm of extension.[6] For understanding how humans act, it is necessary to assume that they know how they can make a meaningful difference in the world of the extension.[7] In other words, they assume that they can translate their intentions into proper action, where the action is causally determined by a correspondent state of the mind, whose factual determination is also the definition of the goal to be achieved through the action itself.[8] It is assumed that any mental state is part of a chain of causes whose result is action and its associated state of mind.[9]
In other words, for any proposition about human action two principles must be assumed: (a) any state of mind has a causal component that can determine a new state of mind or an action, where action must be assumed as a given effect into the extension. If there was a break between the causal power of the mind to determine specific desired effects into the extension, then all the human understanding collapses. Even Kant, whose accounts of morality could at least partially diverge from this idea, had to concede in the Critique of Pure Reason that humans act according to causal principles at least when considered from a third-person perspective. However, there is no reason to believe that, though freedom must be preserved for morality, it does not have specifically to require free will metaphysically but only epistemologically.[10] That is, it is not required for having a functional morality to have a will undetermined by previous causes. On the contrary, there is a clear sense in which the will must be assumed tied to physical reality in causal terms, no matter how the causal connection is understood. From this the principle must follow:
[A] Intentional Causal Principle – For any given human action, a, of a subject S at time t2 there must be a corresponding dispositional belief, B(a), at time t1 where S’s B(a) expresses the intention to cause a through B and the statement ‘a is caused by S’s B(a)’ is also true in some sense.
The closure principle present in [A] is expressed by the condition ‘a is caused by S’s B(a)’ as it requires that S is both the cause of B(a) and a, where a mirrors B(a). Or, once again, a is the desired effect caused by a given corresponding intention. Notably, if a has to be produced by a series of ordered means m1… mn (M), then S obviously has to cause M in its entirety. If ‘a = I am playing chess’, then S has to determine all the cascading series of causes for making a possible (e.g. find a chess set, find a room, find a player etc.). Finally, the closure principle does not restrict the fact that other conditions for action must be met. It only requires that the dispositional belief represented by B(a) is the cause of a – B(a) is intended as the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz’s and classic terms.[11]
(b) For any purposeful human action a, there must be a correspondent description of a into language such that any ordinary human mind is able to understand the action as a proposition ceteris paribus. In other words, it is assumed that a language L is able to express a description of a given action a such that the action can be codified and understood by a subject in propositional terms. This is what can be called ‘principle of transposition’. Human reality is unthinkable without it, as any human action is ordinarily intended having a specific propositional content to be expressed in a given ordinary natural language. To explicate what the principle of transposition is about, let’s bring back a previous analysis: “The principle of transposition states that an action a is the result of a state of mind, which we usually call intention, intuitively conceived as an act of the will to direct the movement of the body in a certain purposeful direction. This principle is regulative on our basic understanding of others’ behavior, which means that I interpret others’ behavior assuming the principle of transposition. Naturally, this assumption stands as a regulative component of our mind’s way of thinking about the world. There is no reason to require that the principle has to be formulated consciously. Instead, it is quite reasonable to assume the opposite considering that its effects in ordinary life in which, we must postulate, the great majority of people show to use it as default [regulative principle of the mind]. Indeed, the contradiction between intentions and deeds is so uniform in the human race that it is not interesting to explore different possibilities.”[12]
[B] Principle of Transposition – Any purposeful human action a can be described through a proposition p of a natural language L such that a is intelligible to any S as a statement p of L.[13]
The principle of transposition is critical in many different aspects of normative evaluation from economics and politics to morality. If I state, ‘I am against McDonalds’ and then I buy a McDonalds’ burger and I eat it, we perceive this as a sheer contradiction in the same fashion than if I directly state it ‘I am against McDonalds and I buy its burgers to eat them’. To be clear, the principle of transposition does not dictate any specific moral commitment. In fact, it is the precursor for any moral commitment, which could be called ‘transposition commitment’.[14] In fact, almost universally morals and religions require the specific commitment to perform as stated and vice versa.[15]
The two principles must be assumed together to understand human action, where with ‘understanding’ here we mean a combination of attributing properties to experienced sense data (action) in specific causal terms such that any action can be properly placed within a framework of meaningful relations between the mind’ and extension’s components.[16] Without intentionality, human action is unintelligible. This is particularly clear when we try to understand somebody who is trying to deceive us and successfully so. We do not grasp the intention behind the action and, as a result, we are surprised by the human action.[17]
Finally, let’s prove that both principles are indeed required for understanding human actions. There are many ways in which [A] can be disproved. Firstly, it could be the case that S is unable to elaborate a dispositional belief B(a) such that a is the corresponding action. This possibility can be absolute (logically impossible) or relatively (nomologically) impossible. To prove that absolute impossibility cannot be the case is quite agile. The possibility is thinkable, that is, there is at least one thinkable possible world in which S is indeed able to produce such dispositional belief. Hence, logically, this is not impossible. Then the question is only whether the actual world is one in which nomologically is impossible for S to produce B(a) as a causal precursor for a. At the very least, we know that we have access to our own states of mind. In addition, ordinarily we understand what it means ‘Humans have states of mind’. In fact, the opposite statement is unthinkable: to state that a given human subject does not have any state of mind is quite difficult to understand. In addition, once admitted that there are states of mind such that intentions are part of them (dispositional beliefs such B(a)) we are also conceding that there is some sort of relation between B(a) and a. This necessarily holds because we can simply have two sets B and A in which B(a) belongs to B and a belongs to B. This is allowed by a simple set theoretical operation. Hence, we can create a third set R such that for any B(n) there is a n such that R(B(n), n) must be the case. Hence, we know for sheer logical reasons that there is a logical relation between the set of beliefs and the set of actions. The last problem is whether R is a causal relation. As we defined [A], and as we described actions, we assumed that actions come after intentions. In terms of timing, dispositional beliefs come first, and actions follow. Hence a conclusion follows. Though it cannot be stated for sure that this actual world is the one in which states of mind can cause actions, we do know that intentions must come first in time. As a result, at the very minimum, the actual world looks like one in which causality between states of mind and actions applies. We can arrive to state that this must always be necessarily the case. Hence, metaphysically we can be still left to hyperbolically doubt but not epistemologically. Indeed, we think and organize life in a way that is epistemologically indistinguishable between a world in which the mind causes action or a world in which the mind does not but practically nothing else changes. If epistemologically it is as if we are sure, practically nothing else changes. In other words, even assuming that causality between the mind and the extension is not the case, nothing would change in practice (or even in theory for what matters!) In other words, according to standards account of causality, where the cause has time primacy and same nature and proportion of the effect, there is no way in which we can say the mind does not cause action.
Let’s come now to the principle of transposition. This is far easier to prove. The only way in which it could be not the case, it would be in the circumstance in which any ordinary natural language L cannot describe a given human action a as a proposition p and, as such, being unintelligible by a proficient user of L. A single history book has so many examples of this that makes the question immediately trivial. We do know that human actions can be described by propositions, and we do rule out both logical and nomological objections.[18]
At this point, we are ready to consider what types of actions are possible and how to classify them according to the effects that they intend to achieve.
Examples of Different Actions – Actions about Physical and Mental Facts, about Linguistic Acts about Facts, Documents and Policies (i.e., Linguistic Acts about Documents and Everything Else)
When I calculate a move of chess, I have to compute a series of variations. Every single calculation made by the mind to produce the specific ‘mind-move’ clearly counts as an action. However, when I physically move my hands to execute the selected move, this action is physical, although intended to induce a change in the opponent’s mind as a final end. Human life is also about language and linguistic production counts as an action. After the chess game is over, the players can entertain themselves by analyzing the game and discussing the value of the moves. This linguistic activity can go as far as exploring the value of the game of chess itself and how the specific game fits within this framework. When I write down the chess move selected into the form of a tournament, I create a document which is not intended for me specifically, as I can remember the game in my internal memory. The document is there for the referee to be seen in case of contention with the other player. The form of the document can vary, but not the fact that it is intended for recording intersubjective conditions about a reality that changed because of us. Documents are linguistic in nature and, as such, count as actions. Documents themselves can be objects of scrutiny and discussions in order to take actions that can influence reality, produce other documents, or shape the narrative. For example, if the international chess federation (FIDE) considers that the chess players are unsatisfied with a certain behavior, recorded on a specific document, they can decide to act accordingly.
These examples intend to simplify multiple levels of human actions partitioned according to the different effects achieved through the change posed by the action. However, as causes and effects do maintain similar nature, this subdivision should capture the multiple layers of human actions: factual, linguistic, documental, and ‘social’. These four different levels admit further subdivisions and partitions, the most important of which is that the factual level includes both minds and bodies, as any action of the mind and any movement of the body counts as a distinctive fact. They can be indeed discriminated against, but when it comes to human action, they count as one.
From the vantage point of view of what a human being can decide at any given time, he/she has only four options: factually act, shape the narrative over given facts, document an action, or shape the narrative over given documents and facts. The subdivision is from the perspective of the action or decision about a given action, not the fact that other metaphysical classifications are impossible. When it comes to action, which is always the result of a more or less conscious intention, those are good categories of understanding under which we can make sense of what we and others do.
Proving the Distinctiveness of the Four Categories of Actions
We have already essentially proved the existence of what we can call ‘facts’, as actions are natural facts of different kind (state of mind or changes within the physical realm). We have already essentially proved the existence and independence of language, at least in the sense that if it must follow rules such that it can describe both beliefs (states of mind) and facts (actions).[19] Documents are linguistic actions recorded into an intersubjective system codified in a specific linguistic and physical way. Differently from speech acts, which already require some forms of intersubjectivity, documents can only exist under the assumption that there are independent rules for recording and registering them. This system of track-record is independent from two different cognitive subjects, S1 and S2, but it is jointly assumed by both.[20]
Finally, linguistic acts purposefully oriented toward the discussion of intersubjective components of documents and their application could be called ‘social facts’, in absence of a better word. In fact, it is very possible to change the nature of document recording, but to do it, it is requested to change the rules of recording, which are expressed in natural language and so recognized across the different actors involved. However, this action is not a document itself, and it requires different operations, which ultimately will affect all levels of human action as any change in the means for producing a giving effect changes also the end themselves. There is no need to discuss the complicated nature of social facts, sufficient is to say that they all require the three different components to exist.
This analysis holds theoretically, that is, from a general and logical standpoint, the factual realm is independent from language, also independent from documents and social reality.[21] However, it does not prove that those realms are autonomous. Indeed, they are not, and this is easy to prove. Let’s assume that they were reciprocally autonomous, that is, they don’t participate in reciprocal causation. Then, we would go back to where we started. It would be impossible to understand human behavior and any form of understanding would be denied. Moreover, from the specific action-oriented discussion, it would be impossible to have any effect on reality. For example, thinking about a move, describing the move, actually move the piece of wood, and writing the move on the forms would be all parallel disjointed actions. This is provably wrong: if I can ask myself if understanding is possible, it is necessarily proved to be actually necessarily the case.[22]
Now, of course, it is possible to subdivide the realm of existence into further subcategories to the point of exhaustiveness. This is not the right place to do it, as instead we are generically framing the possible actions that can be operated by a given subject at any given time. For any decision-making process, the agent always orients himself/herself toward a specific type of action and he/she is intentionally driven by the goal they intend to achieve. This is not a normative judgement, and this is not a normative theory in the sense that it intends to evaluate actions. This is, instead, a purely descriptive understanding of the multiple options an agent has at any given time and, at any given time, the agent can only change his/her mind and/or the body, he/she can speak or write a document or change the social reality. Ultimately, there is no more. For instance, to buy a coffee, the agent has to go to a bar (factual action), ask for the product (speech act), ingest the coffee (physical act) so experiencing its taste (mental state), so he/she can discuss the quality of the coffee (narrative on the product), pay (social act) and take the bill for future recording (document). All these actions are converted into physical operation to ingest the coffee. But without all the rest of human reality, that coffee wouldn’t ever exist.
Human Action in Action
Freedom of choice is essentially the capacity of the subject to determine his/her own actions in accordance with his/her thinking. Any extrinsic limitation to free thinking is an external constraint in the subject. The appropriate course of straight thinking in decision-making consists in the determination of the will (decision-making capacity) through the knowledge of the facts (circumstances) in which the subject is living in. The greater the knowledge of the facts and their details, the greater the subject’s capacity to determine him/herself accordingly. The more this activity is conscientiously determined, the more the meaning the subject will see in it. Perfection in decision-making is essentially denied by the time limitation and by the presence of contrasting information (as it does not count as ‘knowledge‘ strictu sensu).
However, assuming an idealized subject with sufficient time, perfect self-determination (alignment between subject’s thinking and circumstance) is technically possible. However, no subject can be assumed as fully free from prejudices, shared social super-structures, and ‘moralities’. Nor can it be assumed possible to be free from energetic/time constraints. In absence of any ‘common moralities’ the subject is left to self-determination of his/her own values.
When it comes to actions divided according to our categories, the agent can only perform one at a time and he/she should be mindful in considering what he/she wants to do and how to achieve it. In essence, all action is intrinsically dependent on the agent’s capacity to formulate the best intention according to the circumstances in which he/she is in. In this regard, there is no escape from the simple fact that the more one thinks about a given course of action, usually the better and the more meaningful the action is. In fact, the greatest majority of the times in which ordinary people complain of emptiness of existence, in reality is usually because they attach little to no value to what they do. But what they do is in function to what they intend to do.
In order to change reality according to his/her power, the agent must be informed as much as possible about the appropriate means and the landscape of the possible in which he/she is currently situated. Usually, the agent will have to calculate in advance the typology of the means and their order according to causal relations which, in turn, will determine the time of the execution. In this regard, causality determines the timing, not vice versa. For instance, if the desired effect is to buy a car, the agent has to know the price and political rights under which the operation can be done. Accordingly, he/she has to read documents about other documents (e.g. contracts), be mindful of accounting (social objects) and then go to the car dealer (physical action), communicate the will to buy a specific car (speech act) and then actually make the transaction (social object) and move the car (physical action). This chain of events must happen in the right order to execute the will properly. For example, if the car is moved before a contract is signed, that counts as stealing (which is a social action).
The nature of the effect of the actions intrinsically depends on the will and quality of execution and, usually, they are in function of the information and calculation made beforehand to determine the first intention. In general terms, a subject can be strategic in deciding what actions for what purpose, means and order depending on the desired effect. Ceteris paribus an agent should prioritize the action that gives the biggest impact at the least of the cost, including time of execution, unless a delaying action is preferable. In this sense, depending on the circumstances, choosing between the most powerful action in terms of cause and effect is desirable (e.g. signing a document or telling the truth or running a marathon etc.)
From the action point of view the intention could be the (causal) starting point and (logical) end point. Metaphysically and epistemologically, the intention must also be produced by other states of mind whose nature and quality will ultimately determine the overall impact, at least in regard of the subject’s own capacity of effective self-determination from external resistance. Of course, this simple consideration does not imply full satisfaction in the actual execution of the action itself.
Special Cases and Interesting Examples
As we there is no reason to analyze further the categories of action, we can limit ourselves to consider special idealized situations. If an agent wants just to change the physical reality in proximity of their body, all it is required is the proper intention. However, any agent is not isolated and many times the actions must be concerted with other agents (joint action). For doing it, cooperation and agreements are required and, ultimately, coordinated through linguistic acts which mirror the reciprocal states of mind to create a common narrative around the changes to be operated. Shaping the narrative is also an action and can only be pursued through active engagement in linguistic discussions.
The ‘narrative’ is then of critical importance for any human context, as it creates the domain of shared values within which all agents are supposed to start. For example, every gym does the same training slightly differently and it supposes cooperation among the partners. The social environment is actively shaped by the trainees and trainers in a way that is ultimately conducive to cooperation. However, any trainee who firstly join a new gym is obviously assumed open minded and receptive of the shared values that that specific group is sharing, endorse them and convert them into action. For example, in a boxing gym, it is important to appreciate the different levels of the trainees and, when acting in cooperative exchanges, be mindful of the different levels or psychological and physical attitudes of everyone in the gym. Fighting too harshly could be highly inappropriate and, indeed, shameful in most situations.
As the ‘narrative’ has such critical importance, it has political and moral value that goes far beyond what is usually understood. That is why religious or political actors fight so harshly for controlling the ‘narrative’ through public interventions, the control of communications etc.. They very well know that shaping the narrative is another way to bound the actions and joint social operations because they are all ultimately based on intentions and intentions are in turn produced through states of mind.
Another avenue for impact is to use the system of documentations for strategic purposes (that is, the maximization of utility given a certain goal). For example, a publication could count as an outcome but also as a way to shape the narrative of a given field. The very same document, to be produced, likely requires a specific, detailed study that could be the basis for requiring resources and/or included in a CV etc. Then, a document could help to shape multiple aspects of human reality, including the physical domain. For example, if a study proves that a given movement of trucks is illegal, then the authorities can use the evidence gathered in the document to create other executive orders (that is, other documents) whose reading (linguistic act) will trigger the execution of certain actions ultimately blocking the trucks (physical act).
Another fascinating example is what can be called ‘delaying’ actions. For example, a bureaucrat can create a document that jams the production of other documents which, in turn, halt the production of a given good, which are those that the bureaucrat has to record. In this case, the action creates a delay in the execution of other actions. As in war and so in peace, delaying actions are quite important as, sometimes, time only can help the resolution of a given problem.
Ultimately, agents rarely think explicitly in this way, mapping out every category of choice and execution. However, consciously or not, they are capable of such decision-making processes and, indeed, they can be quite effective.
[1] Point shared across the classic liberal thought from Karl Popper to Ludwig Von Mises. Popper argued in favor of liberalism against its enemies in his major work, Open Society and Its Enemies.
[2] See Pili, G., ‘A Pluralistic Understanding of Time – Time as Eternal truths’, Scuola Filosofica, January 2024, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/11906/a-pluralistic-understanding-of-time
[3] Ibid.
[4] Von Mises, L., Human Action, Harvard:Harvard University Press, 11.
[5] See Pili, G., Filosofia pura della guerra, Roma:Aracne, Chap. 5.
[6] The idea that any action must be somehow generically rational could be controversial, unless one understands that here with ‘rationality’ is intended any generic positive determination of goals and means. This does not mean that the human mind has perfect information when determines its will and body to act. On the contrary, rationality is intrinsically limited not only by its own nature (according to Kant’s critique) but also on the available information at disposal for appropriate calculation. Indeed, there is no possible logical doubt on the fact that the ‘future is open’, following both Mises and Popper’s arguments, shared by Pili. As a result, rationality is limited internally and externally in its computational capacity.
[7] More commonly called ‘the physical world’, that is, anything that can be described through the physical science. However, this could lead to the mind/body problem and whether the mind can actually be described by physics. In practice, this is not a very interesting problem in the sense that, no matter how good and precise physics is, we still need a different vocabulary to understand and explain the nature of the mind and its operations.
[8] This considerations were considered in Pili, G., ‘L’efficienza è un valore morale’, Scuola Filosofica, 2021, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/8753/efficienza-morale
[9] Ibid. This point is very similar to what Spinoza argued in his Ethics, where there is a perfect mirroring between mind and body, as they are only two different features of the same natural reality (the infinite substance).
[10] For a defence of this point, see Pili, G., ‘Libertà, volontà e legge morale: una posizione causale neo-kantiana della moralità’, Scuola Filosofica, 2016, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/5538/liberta-volonta-e-legge-morale-una-posizione-causale-neo-kantiana-della-moralita
[11] See, Pili, G., ‘Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz – Vita e opere’, Scuola Filosofica, 2012, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/1567/leibniz-gottfried-wilhelm-von
[12] See Pili, G., ‘The Principle of Transposition – The Untold Story about History’, Scuola Filosofica, 2021, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/11042/principle-of-transposition
[13] Obviously here we are assuming that L is S’ ordinary natural language. There is no reason to be overly pedantic on this point.
[14] For a systematic analysis of the principle of transposition and the transposition commitment, see Pili, G., ‘The Principle of Transposition – The Untold Story about History’, Scuola Filosofica, 2021, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/11042/principle-of-transposition
[15] See Pili, G., ‘L’efficienza è un valore morale’, Scuola Filosofica, 2021, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/8753/efficienza-morale
[16] This is a particular way to combine Kant’s general understanding of meaning (sense data plus concepts) and Mises’ conception of understanding. I think the two can be fruitfully combined, though Kant’s position could possibly include Mises’. The discussion of the detail and why it could be so would bring us far from the main point.
[17] For a systematic analysis of surprise, see: Pili, G., (2023), “A New Theory of Surprise – Unraveling the Logic of Uncertainty and Knowledge,” Intelligence and National Security, 39(4), 695–708, https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2278845
[18] In fact, this is even stronger: it is possible to describe actions in set theoretical terms. For an example, see Pili, G., ‘Natural language and set theoretical and formal logic reductions’, Scuola Filosofica, 2024, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/12145/natural-language-and-set-theoretical-and-formal-logic-reductions
[19] Of course, a similar argument for the physical components of language can be made. However, it refutation would be quite agile and in line with what already discussed in Footnote 6.
[20] For a general overview see Pili, G., ‘The mystery of capitalism is doing things with documents’, Scuola Filosofica, 2020, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/8089/the-mystery-of-capitalism-is-doing-things-with-documents. For something that should widely read and considered a classic, see Smith, B. 2012, “How to do things with documents”, Rivista di estetica, p. 179-198 https://doi.org/10.4000/estetica.1480
[21] The proof of this is agile. No matter how critical theorists say, if we change the word ‘war’ into ‘special operation’, it does not alter the natural facts such as the people dead in the battlefield, no matter how we call the battlefield. Of course, some changes in language can and do produce changes in reality but only indirectly. Similarly, changes in documents do not necessarily change the language or human reality etc..
[22] See Pili, G., ‘On the understandability of the universe and the a priori proof of the existence of God’, Scuola Filosofica, 2023, available at: https://www.scuolafilosofica.com/11429/proof-of-the-existence-of-god
Giangiuseppe Pili
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